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Constraints or Cooperation? 
Determinants of Secondary Forest Cover 




  This study examines the drivers of land use in a shifting cultivation system with forest fallow. 
Forest fallow provides on-farm soil quality benefits, local hydrological regulation, and global 
public goods. An optimal control model demonstrates that farmers have an incentive to fallow 
less than is socially optimal, though market failures limiting crop production can have a coun-
tervailing effect by encouraging fallow. An econometric model estimated using data from the 
Brazilian Amazon suggests that fallowing does not result from internalization of local fallow 
services but instead is associated with poor market access and labor and liquidity constraints. 
 




About 300 million people worldwide practice 
shifting cultivation, or slash-and-burn farming, 
making it a critical driver of carbon cycling in the 
tropics. Secondary forests growing on fallow land 
make up a considerable portion of once-defor-
ested land throughout the Amazon—around 30 
percent, by some estimates (Houghton et al. 2000) 
—underscoring the importance of understanding 
this land-use pattern. Recent research has called 
attention to the contribution of secondary forest 
growth to mitigating the loss of ecosystem ser-
vices caused by tropical deforestation (Wright 
and Muller-Landau 2006, Stokstad 2009). How-
ever, the determinants of forest cover in agricul-
tural systems have received little attention relative 
to natural ecosystems (Blackman et al. 2008). 
  This study examines the drivers of farmers’ 
allocation of land to secondary forest fallow. I use 
household survey and satellite data from the Bra-
gantina area of the Brazilian Amazon, an area that 
is well-poised to provide insights about future 
land-use patterns in frontier regions being rapidly 
settled throughout the Amazon due to its long his-
tory of colonization and secondary-forest–domi-
nated landscape. 
  Forest fallow provides on-site benefits to farm-
ers, such as soil restoration, erosion prevention, 
and weed and pest control. It also provides off-
site services, supplying some of the same local 
and global public goods as mature forests, includ-
ing hydrological regulation, carbon sequestration, 
and biodiversity protection. However, long fallow 
periods are a cost-effective way to restore soil 
quality only where the opportunity cost of land is 
low. Agronomic studies documenting the restora-
tive effects of fallowing on soil quality rarely con-
sider the tradeoffs inherent in keeping land out of 
cultivation. 
  I present a conceptual model of shifting culti-
vation that distinguishes between the on-site 
benefits and local positive externalities of fallow. 
Others have noted that excessive land-clearing can 
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occur in order to establish property rights. This 
model instead highlights the potential for benefi-
cial spillovers to lead to inefficient fallow man-
agement even when farmers have secure tenure. 
In the presence of local fallow externalities, indi-
vidual profit maximization could lead to exces-
sive forest-clearing. The model also illustrates 
how cooperative land management and market 
failures that limit use of agricultural inputs are 
two alternative (though not mutually exclusive) 
reasons why farmers might devote more land to 
fallow than would maximize individual profits. 
  I then use cross-sectional farm survey data 
from the Bragantina area of the Brazilian Amazon 
to examine the factors that affect farmers’ alloca-
tion of land to fallow. A related study using the 
same data found that farmers’ allocation of land 
between cultivation and fallow often exceeded 
the individual profit-maximizing level but was 
efficient from the perspective of the entire com-
munity (Klemick 2011). Positive local external-
ities provide a social, but not individual, rationale 
for the maintenance of large fallow areas. It is 
possible that community management institutions, 
market failures limiting agricultural expansion, or 
other factors encourage farmers to devote excess 
land to fallow. 
  I estimate a spatial econometric model to exam-
ine several potential drivers of fallowing deci-
sions. The presence of hydrological externalities 
that flow from upstream to downstream suggests 
a test of the cooperative management hypothesis, 
since under cooperative institutions, upstream 
farmers should maintain more fallow than their 
neighbors downstream. I include indicators of mar-
ket access such as credit access, off-farm income, 
and transportation infrastructure to test whether 
market failures play a role in fallow allocation. I 
also consider other drivers suggested by the 
conceptual model and previous literature, includ-
ing land tenure, land quality, household charac-
teristics, and market prices. 
 
 
Drivers of Tropical Deforestation and Fallow 
Management 
 
Much of the literature on deforestation is based 
on the land-rent model, noting that the net bene-
fits to different land uses vary with agroclimatic 
and socioeconomic characteristics. These studies 
have drawn attention to the roles of soil quality, 
market access, population density, and off-farm 
work in land conversion in the Amazon (Pfaff 
1999, Chomitz and Thomas 2003) and elsewhere 
(Chomitz and Gray 1996, Nelson and Hellerstein 
1997, Cropper, Puri, and Griffiths 2001, Deinin-
ger and Minten 2002, Angelsen and Kaimowitz 
1999).
1 
  Evidence on the effects of land tenure security 
and credit availability on deforestation has been 
mixed (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999). Secure 
land tenure has tended to reduce the probability 
of deforestation in empirical household-level 
studies (Pínchon 1997, Godoy et al. 1998), unless 
land-clearing is undertaken in order to establish 
tenure. Deforestation has often been positively 
associated with credit availability, though a study 
from the Amazon including municipality credit 
infrastructure found no correlation between the 
two (Pfaff 1999). 
  Research focusing on secondary forest fallow 
in shifting cultivation systems raises similar is-
sues, highlighting off-farm income, distance from 
markets, soil quality, credit availability, and land 
tenure. Perz and Walker (2002) found that off-
farm businesses were negatively associated with 
secondary forest growth, while credit use was 
unrelated. Tenure insecurity in communal prop-
erty arrangements in West Africa has been shown 
to be associated with inadequate fallowing (Gold-
stein and Udry 2008, López 1993, 1997). Family 
labor availability and the labor-leisure tradeoff 
are important for land use under incomplete labor 
markets (Coomes, Grimard, and Burt 2000, Perz 
and Walker 2002, Caviglia-Harris 2004). Land 
availability also plays a role, with several studies 
finding that smaller farms cultivate land more 
intensively (Scatena et al. 1996, Smith et al. 
1999). A bio-economic farm-level linear pro-
gramming model calibrated using the same data 
as this paper found that payments for ecosystem 
services, a tightening of the legal restrictions on 
forest-clearing, and adoption of Brazil’s proposed 
Proambiente smallholder credit program that pro-
motes mechanical mulching of fallow and re-
stricts chemical fertilizer use would lead to in-
                                                                                    
1 Some of these results have been shown to be reversed in Mexican 
shade coffee plantations, which rely on tree cover as a factor of pro-
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creases in secondary forest cover, though the 
latter two policies would do so at the expense of 
farm income (Borner, Mendoza, and Vosti 2007). 
  A few studies have explored how cooperative 
management affects land-clearing. Cooperative 
natural resource management has been found in 
situations where social cohesion fosters effective 
communication and enforcement mechanisms 
(Ostrom 1990). Alix-Garcia, de Janvry, and Sa-
doulet (2005) found that Mexican agricultural 
communities’ use of common-property forests de-
pended on the number of households expected to 
gain from cooperation.
2 
  Recent studies have also noted the importance 
of the location of farms not just in relation to geo-
graphical features like roads, but to each other. 
Alix-Garcia (2007) showed that the location of 
deforestation on communal property in Mexico 
depended on not just the absolute but the relative 
quality of land parcels within the community. 
Several studies have found a spatial lag in defor-
estation, indicating that farmers’ land-clearing 
decisions were influenced by their neighbors, 
though the direction of the effect is not consistent 
across studies (Robalino, Pfaff, and Sanchez-
Azofeifa 2007, Caldas et al. 2007, Nelson and 
Hellerstein 1997). This study builds on the litera-
ture by investigating the effect of spatial interac-
tions, community cooperation, and missing mar-
kets on privately owned land managed in a shift-
ing cultivation system. 
 
Conceptual Model of Shifting Cultivation with 
Fallow Externalities 
 
Shifting cultivation involves a tradeoff between 
expanding cultivation today and restoring land 
quality for cultivation in the future. Models of 
shifting cultivation have specified land quality as 
a function of fallow length or area (Larson and 
Bromley 1990, Barrett 1991, Krautkraemer 1994). 
López (1993, 1997, 1998) modeled the fallow bio-
mass stock as a village-level common property 
resource that contributed to productivity. In the 
absence of community-level management, indi-
vidual households undervalued biomass and allo-
                                                                                    
2 Other research has used game theoretic models to highlight the po-
tential for conflict over land-clearing decisions (Angelsen 2001, Al-
ston, Libecap, and Mueller 2000).  
cated too much land to cultivation, decreasing in-
come for the village as a whole. 
  I examine the inefficiencies that can arise in 
fallow management under private land ownership 
when local externalities associated with forest 
cover create the scope for inefficient manage-
ment.
3 The tenure security assumption obviates 
the need to examine land-clearing as an invest-
ment decision to establish use rights in an open-
access regime (Takasaki 2007). Under private 
land ownership, fallow biomass is not a common 
property resource, but rather a private resource 
supplying beneficial spillovers. 
  Total fallow biomass on farm i, θi(t), is equal 
to the farm’s average fallow biomass density, 
ηi(t), times the land area left fallow. Letting Ai re-
present total farm area and xi(t) cultivated area, 
this relationship can be written θi(t) = ηi(t)[Ai – 
xi(t)]. Average biomass density is a stock variable 
that captures the relationship between fallow and 
cultivation: a greater fraction of land under culti-
vation leads to shorter average fallow periods and 
less biomass accumulation (López 1993). Aver-
age biomass density on fallow land thus declines 
with the biomass extracted during land-clearing, 
which is proportional to the fraction of land under 












η= − . 
  López included the village-level stock of fallow 
biomass as a factor of production. In contrast, I 
allow fallow to boost crop productivity through 
two separate effects—average on-farm biomass 
and local off-site biomass. These two effects cap-
ture the private soil-enhancing benefits and po-
tential hydrological or other externalities of forest 
fallow.
4 On-farm fallow biomass can also yield 
forest products like wood or honey that can be 
harvested for consumption or sale. 
                                                                                    
3 This discussion expands on a similar optimal control model that ap-
pears in an online appendix to Klemick (2011), which can be accessed 
at http://aere.org/journals/. 
4 Local externalities with the potential to boost farm productivity 
include moderation of soil water flows and availability of pollinators 
for crop and honey production. Empirical studies have shown that off-
farm forest cover is an important input to agricultural productivity in 
the Bragantina (Klemick 2011) and in other tropical farming systems 
(López 1993, 1997, Pattanayak and Kramer 2001, Pattanayak and Bu-
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  The production function for farm i’s crop and 
forest product output is 
  
() , () , () , () , ()
i N
i
ii ii j j fx t z t l t t t ⎛⎞ θΣ θ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, 
where zi(t) represents a vector of variable inputs 
like fertilizer and li(t) represents farm labor. The 
production function is increasing and concave in 
all inputs, and all factors are gross complements. 
N is the total number of farms in the community, 
Ni represents the number of farms that provide 
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is the total fallow biomass on these farms. Since 
this paper considers a hydrological externality, Ni 
is the number of farms upstream of farm i. 
  The household maximizes the present value of 
the stream of revenues from crops and forest 
products, minus input and land-clearing costs, 
plus off-farm income. For the sake of tractability, 
I focus on profit maximization rather than utility 
maximization.
5 The household faces a labor en-
dowment (net of leisure) Li. Off-farm wage in-
come is equal to the wage rate times this endow-
ment minus farm labor; if farm labor exceeds the 
labor endowment, this indicates that labor is hired 
to work on the farm at the prevailing wage. A 
liquidity constraint limiting purchased input costs 
to the sum of off-farm income plus a capital en-
dowment Ki is given by 
   () [ () ] ii i i vz t K w L l t ≤+ − , 
representing an illustrative market failure that 
could limit agricultural production. Assuming a 
discount rate δ, output price p, input price v, wage 
rate  w, and land-clearing cost c, the household 
chooses land area, purchased inputs, and farm 
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5 The use of profit maximization to describe farm production deci-
sions typically assumes that production is independent of household 
preferences. This assumption may be simplistic, as noted by other re-
search on smallholder agriculture emphasizing the importance of the 
household production framework and labor-leisure tradeoff (Singh, 
Squire, and Strauss 1986, Caviglia-Harris 2004).  
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  A social planner maximizing community-wide 
farm profits confronts a similar problem but in-
stead chooses land, purchased inputs, and labor 
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Suppressing the time argument, the current value 
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The Hamiltonian represents the current value of 
the sum of farm profits for the entire community, 
where µ is the costate variable representing the 
shadow value of the fallow biomass stock. 
  At steady-state levels of η and µ, long-run equi-
librium biomass density and total biomass are in-
versely proportional to the share of land under 






















Using these equalities and the necessary condi-
tions for land allocation and the evolution of the 
biomass shadow value, the farmer’s steady-state 
land allocation decision can be written as 
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This condition illustrates that the marginal benefit 
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ginal costs in terms of land-clearing, foregone 
soil quality on-farm, and reduced positive exter-
nalities to other farms downstream, now and in 
the future. Mi is the number of farms downstream 
to which farm i provides hydrological services, 
and  5
k f
 is the marginal productivity of off-farm 
fallow on these farms. Without the steady-state 











which represents an additional cost to expanding 
cultivation if the biomass stock is declining over 
time rather than stable, implying a rising shadow 
value (López 1998). Conversely, if biomass is 
growing over time, expanding cultivation is less 
costly. 
  I derive comparative statics to infer how vari-
ous parameters affect the amount of cultivated 
land and fallow maintained by farmers, depend-
ing on whether the liquidity constraint is bind-
ing.
6 I retain the steady-state assumption and also 
assume that other farms are in equilibrium for the 
sake of tractability, but the results are not materi-
ally affected by these assumptions.
7 Table 1 indi-
cates that higher discount rates and crop prices 
always encourage expansion of cultivated area at 
the expense of fallow. An increase in the number 
of downstream farms, Mi, boosts fallowing if 
farm  i accounts for the positive externalities it 
provides, as assumed under cooperative manage-
ment. More fallow on neighboring farms up-
stream has a direct positive effect on cultivated 
area, but when the household is liquidity-con-
strained, the net impact is ambiguous because on-
farm labor and purchased inputs cannot both be 
increased as well; an increase in either of these 
inputs must be accompanied by a decrease in the 
other. 
  The effects of input prices and labor and capital 
endowments also depend on the liquidity con-
                                                                                    
6 Necessary conditions and steady-state comparative statics deriva-
tions are available from the author. 
7 If the steady-state assumption is relaxed to consider what happens if 
the fallow biomass stock declines over time (a situation of concern in 
many tropical forest margins), the comparative static results for land 
allocation remain qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 1, 
though if the biomass stock grows, it is theoretically possible that the 
results for the impact of the discount rate on cultivated land could 
reverse.  
straint. If it is not binding, then increases in both 
input prices and wages discourage cultivation by 
drawing inputs and labor off-farm, respectively, 
and capital and labor endowments have no effect 
on land allocation decisions. If the household is 
liquidity-constrained, then purchased inputs and 
labor are underused relative to the optimal level, 
similar to López and Romano (2000). Rising in-
put prices have an ambiguous effect on land allo-
cation: they limit cultivation by making inputs 
more expensive, but also encourage on-farm work 
because off-farm labor is less effective in pur-
chasing inputs. An increase in the wage rate has 
the opposite effect: it encourages a shift in labor 
from on- to off-farm activities but (assuming the 
household does not hire farm labor) allows in-
creased input purchases. As the capital and labor 
endowments rise, the household has more capac-
ity to increase both purchased inputs and labor 
used on-farm, leading to an expansion of culti-
vated area. Thus, households with limited access 
to capital and labor may devote more land to fal-
low than would be optimal if unconstrained, sug-
gesting that market failures could have important 
impacts on land management patterns. 
  The optimal control model can be extended to 
consider a case without centralized or cooperative 
fallow management, in which farmers have no 
incentive to weigh foregone externalities as a 
cost. When farmers fail to internalize the biomass 
externality, they expand the area under cultiva-
tion. Aggregate community welfare in this case is 
lower due to underprovision of the externality. 
Assuming a steady state,
8 the land allocation con-
dition becomes 
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. 
 
This expression is similar to equation (1), but it 
excludes the final term, which represents the value 
of the ecological services provided by farm i to 
downstream farmers, indicating that without co-
operative institutions, farmers are expected to al-
locate too much land to cultivation. However, as 
                                                                                    
8 The effect of the steady-state assumption in the individual profit-
maximization case echoes that in the cooperative management case: if 
fallow biomass is declining, then clearing fallow has an additional cost, 
but the impacts of key parameters on land allocation remain qualita-
tively unchanged.  476    December 2011  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Steady-State Comparative Statics  
  dδ i  dp dv  dw  dKi dLi dM i  d
i N
j ji ≠ Σθ  
No liquidity constraints, cooperative profit maximization 
dxi  + + -  -  0  0  -  + 
dθ i  -  -  +  + 0 0 + - 
Binding liquidity constraints, cooperative profit maximization 
dxi  + + ?  ?  +  +  -  ? 
dθ i -  -  ? ?  -  -  +  ? 
Binding liquidity constraints, individual profit maximization 
dxi  + + ?  ?  +  +  0  ? 
dθ i -  -  ? ?  -  -  0  ? 
 
 
noted in the previous case, liquidity and labor 
constraints could be a countervailing factor cur-
tailing expansion of cultivation. Accordingly, mar-
ket failures that limit agricultural expansion be-
low the privately optimal level could result in a 
second-best outcome in which land allocation is 
optimal from a community perspective, even if no 
cooperative management strategy exists. 
  Comparative statics for this case are qualita-
tively the same as under cooperative management 
(Table 1). One exception is the number of farms 
downstream of farm i; since farms do not inter-
nalize the value of the hydrological services they 
provide, Mi has no effect on land allocation. 
  These results suggest several testable hypothe-
ses about land management in private tenure 
shifting cultivation systems. If farmers deviate 
from private income-maximization, are there in-
stitutional, socioeconomic, or other factors that 
help explain this decision? Do community en-
forcement mechanisms encourage farmers to 
internalize the value of the fallow externalities 
they provide to farmers downstream? Or are 
market failures responsible for potential devia-
tions from individual profit-maximization? After 
discussing the study region and data, I return to 
these questions. 
 
Study Region and Data 
 
The Bragantina is a collection of 14 municipali-
ties situated east of Belém, the state capital of 
Pará. The region has a century-long history of ag-
ricultural settlement and is relatively integrated 
into regional markets through railways and roads. 
Shifting cultivation remains the principal means 
of livelihood despite agronomic evidence that 
converting fallow to cultivated land and replacing 
the lost soil nutrients with chemical fertilizer 
could increase farm profits (Toniolo and Uhl 
1995). Virtually all virgin forest in the region has 
been cleared for several decades, but secondary 
vegetation covers approximately 75 percent of 
total land area (Kato et al. 1999). 
  Data were collected as part of the SHIFT (Stud-
ies on Human Impact on Forests and Floodplains 
in the Tropics) project, an initiative to study live-
lihoods and ecosystem dynamics in Brazil. Three 
municipalities were selected to capture regional 
variation in distance to commercial centers, agri-
cultural intensification, and agroecology. In late 
2002, 271 households in 22 villages were ran-
domly chosen and surveyed about their land use, 
cropping practices, sources of income, and other 
socioeconomic attributes. 
  Most of the sampled households are considered 
smallholders by Brazilian standards, with median 
landholdings of 25 hectares. While family labor 
and manual land-clearing and cultivation pre-
dominate, hired labor and mechanized equipment 
are also used for labor-intensive tasks like land 
preparation, weeding, and harvesting. The humid 
tropical climate supports rainfed cultivation, re-
ceiving rainfall of 2,400–2,700 mm annually. A Klemick  Constraints or Cooperation? Determinants of Secondary Forest Cover Under Shifting Cultivation   477 
 
 
typical one-to-two-year cropping sequence in-
cludes maize, upland rice, and cowpea, with cas-
sava grown as the final crop while fallow vegeta-
tion reestablishes (Holscher et al. 1997). These 
annual crops are consumed at home or sold to 
regional markets. Since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, smallholders have branched into perennials 
like black pepper, passion fruit, and oranges, as 
well as cattle production. Many farms also har-
vest non-timber forest products from their fallow 
plots. 
  Fallow in the study area is composed of a mo-
saic of vegetation in various stages of regrowth, 
from grasses and shrubs to closed-canopy tree 
cover. Typical fallow lengths of four to eight 
years result in tree cover reaching heights of three 
to ten meters. Forest fallow in Bragantina exhibits 
many similarities with virgin forest, providing 
similar levels of nutrient accumulation and below-
ground carbon storage, though less above-ground 
carbon storage and tree species diversity (Som-
mer, Denich, and Vlek 2000, Holscher et al. 1997, 
Kato et al. 1999, Tucker, Brondizio, and Moran 
1998). 
  Farmer-reported fallow area data are used to 
measure on-farm fallow and to estimate forest 
fallow upstream of each farm. As an alterative 
measure of upstream forest fallow, I use MODIS 
Vegetation Continuous Fields (VCF)  GIS data. 
The  VCF data consist of 25-hectare resolution 
pixels created using 40-day composite satellite 
images from March 2001 through March 2002 
(Hansen et al. 2006). Each pixel represents per-
cent canopy cover, defined as the amount of sun-
light blocked by tree canopies over five meters 
high.
9 The resolution is sufficiently fine to reflect 
land use on farms in the region, since the median 
farm is 25 hectares. GIS data can be used to iden-
tify secondary forest fallow in the Bragantina be-
cause virtually all tree cover in the region is fal-
low rather than virgin forest. 
  I also use GIS flow direction data from the U.S. 
Geological Survey (1999) to determine where 
farms lie along a gradient from upstream to down-
                                                                                    
9 GIS coordinates are missing for 10 farms in the sample. The survey-
derived upstream fallow variable is missing for an additional 25 obser-
vations that had no upstream neighbors among the sampled farmers. 
Table 2 indicates that fallow area is more prevalent than canopy cover 
on average (covering 68 percent of upstream area versus 25 percent), 
which is unsurprising since canopy cover excludes vegetation under 
five meters tall.  
stream. According to a flow direction map for the 
region, farms cluster into 11 groups defined by a 
common drainage area and flow direction. Each 
cluster includes at least one sampled community. 
I assume that, within each group, each observa-
tion affects farms downstream and is affected by 
farms upstream. I also use 1-km resolution data 
from the U.S. Geological Survey (1999) on slope 
and flow accumulation, defined as the size of the 
drainage area upstream of each farm. 
  Table 2 presents a variety of household and 
farm characteristics included in the analysis. Sur-
veyed farmers kept a large portion of their land in 
fallow—almost 70 percent on average. However, 
14 percent did not devote any land to fallow, 
practicing continuous cultivation with intensive 
use of chemical inputs instead of shifting cultiva-
tion. While fallow area data provide only a snap-
shot of land management patterns over a multi-
year cycle, the decision to eliminate fallow in 
favor of continuous cultivation represents a more 
permanent shift in land management that is diffi-
cult to reverse, at least in the short-to-medium 
term. In addition, the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical model still hold whether or not the 
system is in a steady state. 
  Most of the sampled households held title to 
the land they farmed (65 percent). Participation in 
off-farm jobs ranging from day labor to petty 
trading to teaching was common, with households 
earning an average of B$980. Many households 
also received remittances, scholarships, means-
tested old-age pensions, or consumption subsidies 
for purchases of gas and food, resulting in B$1,671 
of income on average. Despite a well-developed 
road network, the average household could access 
transportation to markets less than once a day, 
and an additional survey of 25 of the study parti-
cipants found that 16 percent of the subsample 
identified transportation problems as a primary 
source of income risk (Borner 2006). 
  Farmers in the Brazilian Amazon can access 
commercial credit through the FNO (Fundo Con-
stitucional de Financiamento do Norte), a pro-
gram targeting low-interest loans to smallholders 
since the late 1980s. In practice, complicated bu-
reaucracy and other transaction costs often render 
the loans inaccessible (Andrae and Pingel 2001). 
PRONAF (National Program for the Strengthening 
of Smallholder Agriculture), a late-1990s govern-
ment initiative to fund agro-industrial projects, 478    December 2011  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Household Characteristics (271 households) 
  Mean Std.  Dev. 
FALLOW MANAGEMENT VARIABLES    
  Percent area under fallow   0.69  (0.33) 
  Allocate some land to fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.86  (0.35) 
  Percent area under fallow on all upstream farms within the same sub-watershed (survey data)  0.68  (0.19) 
  Percent area under canopy cover at least 5 meters high on upstream land within 3 kilometers 
  (GIS  data) 
0.25 (0.09) 
AGROECOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS    
  Flow accumulation (kilometers squared)   18.07  (79.19) 
 Slope  (degrees)  2.65 (2.54) 
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS    
  Farm size (hectares)  40.73 (47.97) 
  Household head education (years)  3.81  (2.98) 
  Present working age (16–64) household members    2.99  (1.60) 
  Absent working-age household members  0.75  (1.39 ) 
  Present non–working-age household members  2.22  (1.72) 
  Absent non–working-age household members  0.08  (0.33) 
  Distance from household to market (kilometers)  23.10  (12.50) 
  Transportation frequency (1 = 1×/week, 2 = 2×/week, 3 = 3×/week, 4 = 1×/day, 5 = >1×/day)  3.86 (1.37) 
  Off-farm wage income (R$)
a  979.67 (2,116.84) 
  Off-farm non-wage income (pensions, remittances, public assistance, scholarships) (R$)  1,670.78 (4,017.43) 
  Access to credit (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.55  (0.50) 
  Own farmland with legal title (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.65  (0.48) 
  Community association meetings per month  0.68  (0.45) 
  Purchased input expenditures (R$)  1,039.05  (3,445.65) 
  Agricultural revenue (R$)  7,435.88  (14,685.36) 
PRODUCTION PRICES    
  Community crop price average (R$/kg)  1.94  (0.86) 
  Farmer-reported forest product price average (R$/kg) 6.95  (14.18) 
  Community fertilizer price average (R$/kg)  0.93  (0.10) 
a US$1 = R$2.97, 2002 average. 
 
 
also offers credit to smallholders. Thirty-one per-
cent of sampled farmers obtained bank credit dur-
ing the previous decade, and an additional 24 per-
cent reported that it would be easy or very easy to 
obtain a loan. Thus, small-scale farmers in the 
Bragantina have better access to credit than their 
peers in other rural areas of Latin America, in 
keeping with the higher level of economic devel-
opment in the region.
10 
                                                                                    
10 A survey of six Latin American countries found credit accessible to 
only 8–33 percent of farmers (López and Valdéz 2000).  Klemick  Constraints or Cooperation? Determinants of Secondary Forest Cover Under Shifting Cultivation   479 
 
 
  A related study using the same data measured 
the contribution of cultivated area, on-farm fallow 
area, upstream fallow area, and other inputs to 
agricultural production among surveyed house-
holds (Klemick 2011). It found that on-farm and 
upstream fallow were both important factors of 
production, confirming that fallow provides valu-
able ecosystem services to local agriculture, some 
internal to the farm and some external. 
  Klemick used the estimated elasticities from the 
farm production function to test whether farmers 
allocated land efficiently between cultivation and 
fallow either from an individual perspective or 
from a community perspective (i.e., considering 
the value of local externalities to downstream 
farmers). Equations (1) and (2) from the optimal 
control model provided the basis for these two 
tests, respectively. The results showed that a ma-
jority of farmers allocated too much land to fal-
low to maximize individual profits, but the re-
sulting pattern of land allocation was efficient for 
the entire community due to positive local exter-
nalities. The average farm could have signifi-
cantly increased farm profits by R$574 for every 
hectare of fallow cleared and put into cultivation 
(a 0.42 percent increase in profits for every 1 per-
cent expansion of cultivation into fallow area). 
However, additional clearing would not have in-
creased community-level profits because expand-
ing cultivation would have reduced farm produc-
tivity downstream. These results suggest a devia-
tion from individual profit-maximizing behavior 
in the study area, but they shed no light on the 
reasons for this pattern. 
 
 
Econometric Model of Fallow Management 
 
In this section, I consider several potential drivers 
of land allocation among sampled farmers in 
Bragantina. I estimate a model that, in its simplest 










=β +β +β +ε . 
 
The dependent variable represents the percent 
area allocated to fallow on farm i (retaining the 
notation from the optimal control model). H and 
Y are vectors of household socioeconomic and 
agroecological attributes expected to affect land 
allocation, while εi is a white noise error term. 
  Because fallowing is censored, with 14 percent 
of the sample practicing continuous cultivation 
without fallow, I estimate a two-part hurdle model 
(Wooldridge 2001). The hurdle model allows me 
to examine the effects of the explanatory vari-
ables on both the decision to use shifting culti-
vation and the amount of land allocated to fallow 
conditional on using shifting cultivation, rather 
than assuming that the variables have the same ef-
fect across the two decisions.
11 The model can be 
written as 
 
(4)     12
12
,{ 0 , 1 }
if 1,
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where  D denotes a dummy variable indicating 
allocation of some land to fallow. The selection 
equation is estimated using a probit model, while 
the conditional outcome equation can be esti-
mated by ordinary least squares. 
  I also estimate a spatial econometric model to 
account for potential interactions among fallow 
management patterns across the landscape. Since 
upstream fallow significantly improves down-
stream productivity in the study area (Klemick 
2011), it is possible that farmers take upstream 
land cover into account in their fallow manage-
ment decisions, as predicted by the comparative 
statics. I include a weighted average of upstream 
neighbors’ fallow area as a right-hand-side vari-
able in the fallow equation—in other words, a 
spatial lag in the dependent variable—to test this 
hypothesis. As described above, I use both the 
household survey data on land use and GIS data 
on canopy cover to construct alterative measures 
of upstream fallow. I use a general spatial model 
that also incorporates spatial autocorrelation in 
the error term: 
                                                                                    
11 The Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) would generalize 
the problem by allowing for correlation among the error terms of the 
two processes. The Heckman model is superior in theory because it 
corrects for selection bias, which, if present and not controlled for, can 
lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the outcome equation. 
However, the lack of a valid exclusion restriction that explains the 
binary decision to fallow but not the extent of fallow area prevents use 
of the Heckman model. There are no obvious candidates for an exclu-
sion restriction in the data set, and the theoretical model of fallowing 
provides little guidance in this respect. 480    December 2011  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 









=β +β +β +ρ +ε ∑
   
where εi = λWε + ui. 
  The correlation coefficient of the spatial lag is 
represented by ρ. The disturbance term, εi, has a 
spatially correlated component and a white noise 
term, ui. A spatial autoregressive model accounts 
for the fact that unobserved factors may influence 
farmers’ and their neighbors’ land use decisions 
in similar ways, allowing for efficient estimation 
of the parameters. The magnitude of spatial corre-
lation among the disturbances is represented by λ. 
I estimate the spatial model as a two-part hurdle 
model, akin to equation (4), estimating separate 
spatial probit and continuous regressions. 
  W is the spatial weighting matrix of the error 
term and is comprised of inverse distances be-
tween all sampled farms, reflecting correlation in 
unobserved factors declining with distance, such 
as weather shocks. Unlike W, the spatial weight-
ing matrix of the lag in the dependent variable is 
row-normalized.
12 The uniqueness of the two spa-
tial weighting matrices is justified conceptually, 
and it allows for identification of the spatial auto-
regressive parameters.
13 However, if spatial cor-
relation among the disturbances follows the same 
pattern as the hydrological externality, then these 
effects cannot be disentangled without further pa-
rameter restrictions. 
  Estimation of the spatial lag model must ad-
dress the potential endogeneity caused by omitted 
variables correlated with fallow allocation that 
vary over space. For example, if farmers hire out 
their labor to nearby farms, leading them to culti-
vate less while their neighbors intensify cultiva-
tion, a negative spatial lag in fallow could ensue. 
I employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach 
to obtain asymptotically consistent parameter esti-
mates (Anselin 1988). Anselin suggests using spa-
tial lags of exogenous regressors as instruments 
for the lagged dependent variable. I follow this 
                                                                                    
12 The matrix is row-normalized by dividing each element of the 
matrix by the number of upstream farms so that each row sums to one. 
Normalizing the spatial lag term by the number of sampled farms in 
each farm’s neighborhood is important to avoid inferring that farms 
with more sampled neighbors have higher levels of nearby forest 
cover. There is no such reason to normalize W. 
13 Spatial lag and spatial error parameters are generally not identified 
without nonlinear restrictions when the two weighting matrices are the 
same (Anselin 1988). 
approach, using the slope, farm size, and trans-
portation frequency of upstream farms to instru-
ment for upstream forest fallow.
14 Robalino, Pfaff, 
and Sanchez-Azofeifa’s (2007) study of Costa 
Rican deforestation employed a similar approach, 
instrumenting for nearby land-clearing with neigh-
bors’ agroecological characteristics, although it 





Building on the conceptual model and the empiri-
cal literature on the causes of tropical deforesta-
tion, I consider a variety of socioeconomic and 
agroecological variables that could drive land-use 
decisions. One hypothesis of interest concerns 
whether farmers maintain excessive fallow land 
from an individual perspective because they de-
liberately internalize the local externalities their 
land provides to downstream farmers. Coopera-
tive land-use patterns could occur if formal or 
informal community institutions allow for com-
munication and enforcement (Ostrom 1990). The 
comparative statics from the conceptual model 
suggest that if farmers manage land to maximize 
community income, then farms positioned higher 
in the watershed (those with more downstream 
neighbors) will allocate more land to fallow. As a 
test of this hypothesis, I include watershed posi-
tion, measured by the GIS flow accumulation vari-
able, as a regressor in the fallow equation.
15 I also 
include the number of association meetings held 
per month in the community as an indicator of the 
level of community organization. A negative flow 
accumulation coefficient and a positive associa-
tion meetings coefficient would suggest that com-
munity institutions are successful at inducing 
farmers further upstream to maintain more of 
their land in fallow to provide local hydrological 
services. 
                                                                                    
14 These three variables were jointly significant in predicting 
upstream survey-derived fallow area and GIS canopy cover, with 
Shea’s partial R2 statistics of 0.62 and 0.05, respectively (p < 0.01 for 
both models).  
15 As an alternative measure of watershed position, I use GIS flow 
direction data to determine where farms lie along a gradient from up-
stream to downstream in relation to one another within each of the 11 
sub-watersheds in the study area, yielding a measure of farms’ relative 
rather than absolute positions. These results were qualitatively similar 
to the flow accumulation results. Klemick  Constraints or Cooperation? Determinants of Secondary Forest Cover Under Shifting Cultivation   481 
 
 
  I also consider the role of market imperfec-
tions. I include distance from the community 
market and village-level transportation frequency 
to capture the effects of physical market access. 
As one measure of access to liquidity, I construct 
a binary credit access variable similar to that sug-
gested by Boucher, Barham, and Carter (2005) and 
Gitter and Barham (2007), using data on farmer-
reported commercial credit use and ease of ob-
taining a loan. I consider the farmer to have ac-
cess to credit if he or she either borrowed money 
from a cooperative or bank over 1999–2002, or 
did not borrow money but responded that it 
would be “easy” or “very easy” to get a loan. 
Credit access is arguably endogenous because it 
could depend on risk preferences, shocks, and 
farm technology choice, all factors subsumed in 
the residuals of the fallow equation. Including 
this variable serves at minimum as an indicator of 
the correlation between credit availability and 
land management even if I cannot draw firm con-
clusions about the direction of causality.
16 
  I include additional variables to examine the 
role of labor and liquidity constraints, including 
off-farm wage and non-wage income normalized 
by total farm area. Off-farm employment could 
discourage cultivation by drawing labor off the 
farm, particularly if liquidity constraints are not 
binding. In fact, off-farm income could be en-
dogenous with fallowing if labor and land-use 
decisions are made simultaneously, leading to an 
upward bias on this coefficient. Alternately, it 
could encourage cultivation by providing a source 
of income to purchase farm inputs if liquidity 
constraints are a concern. Non-wage income could 
provide capital for farm investments without 
drawing labor off-farm, though it might have a 
negligible effect on land management if it largely 
consists of subsidies used for household consum-
ption. I also include four variables to capture 
household size and composition: the numbers of 
                                                                                    
16 I also attempted to control for endogeneity by using durable house-
hold assets to instrument for credit access. I constructed an assets 
variable equal to the primary factor from a factor analysis of ownership 
of the following assets: bedroom furniture, kitchen furniture, living 
room furniture, refrigerator, bathroom, bicycle, car, truck, motorcycle, 
television, satellite dish, radio, cassette player, sewing machine, and 
camera. All variables loaded positively onto the factor, with loadings 
ranging from 0.12 to 0.74. The household assets variable is a positive 
and significant predictor of credit access, with a Shea’s partial R2 of 
0.04 (p < 0.01). While not an ideal instrument, durable assets should 
not be contemporaneously correlated with land management. The IV 
estimate of the credit access coefficient was negative and significant.  
household members of working age (age 16–64) 
and non-working age (under 16 and over 64) 
living on the farm and absent from the farm, all 
normalized by total farm size. If labor and liquid-
ity markets are imperfect, a smaller labor endow-
ment could limit cultivation. 
  The theoretical model generally predicts that 
farms facing higher discount rates allocate more 
land to cultivation and less to fallow. Previous re-
search has found that regions with more secure 
land tenure, often interpreted as a proxy for low 
discount rates, experience less deforestation (An-
gelsen and Kaimowitz 1999, Deacon 1999, Cat-
taneo 2001). I include a binary variable for formal 
land ownership in the fallow equations. 
  Other explanatory variables include GIS data on 
slope as an indicator of land quality and the log of 
farm size as a proxy for land constraints. While 
slopes are relatively flat in the study area, it is 
possible that minor variations could still affect 
fallow. Education level, represented by the house-
hold head’s years of schooling, could also affect 
preferences or farm management ability, though 
the direction of the effect on fallowing is unclear. 
  I also include crop, forest product, and fertilizer 
prices to control for market conditions, which the 
optimal control model shows to be important de-
terminants of land allocation. Crop and fertilizer 
price indices are calculated as village-level 
weighted averages (e.g., the price of each crop is 
weighted by its village-level output share), while 
forest product prices are weighted averages at the 
household level. 
  As an alternative to including prices and other 
village-level variables, I also estimate village fixed- 
effects logit and continuous regression models to 
focus on variation within communities and con-
trol for market conditions, transportation costs, 
agroecological variation, employment opportuni-





Table 3 presents the results from the basic hurdle, 
spatial hurdle, and fixed-effects models. All equa-
tions have reasonable explanatory power, with R
2 
or pseudo-R
2 statistics from 0.35 to 0.79. The 
spatial model is estimated using the two measures 
of upstream fallow discussed above. The spatial 
correlation coefficient is only weakly signifi-
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models, indicating that unobserved factors vary-
ing with distance between farms do little to ex-
plain fallow management.
17 Nor does lagged fal-
low have a significant effect on land allocation 
using either measure, suggesting that farmers do 
not expand production in response to ecosystem 
services from upstream land cover. Village ef-
fects were jointly significant (p = 0.015) in the 
continuous fixed-effects model, and they perfectly 
predicted fallow outcomes for 11 villages in the 
logit model.
18 Results from this model are similar 
to those from the non–fixed-effects models, indi-
cating that factors that vary within villages are 
important in explaining fallow management. 
  The coefficients of flow accumulation and the 
number of community association meetings offer 
a test of the hypothesis that Bragantina farmers 
intentionally internalize the positive hydrological 
externalities that flow upstream to downstream. If 
upstream farmers deliberately maintain higher 
levels of fallow to boost productivity in the com-
munity, the flow accumulation coefficient should 
be negative. However, the results show that wa-
tershed position, as measured by flow accumula-
tion, has no significant effect on fallow alloca-
tion. In addition, farmers in communities with 
more active associations are actually less likely to 
practice shifting cultivation. These results suggest 
that the high levels of fallow maintained among 
surveyed farmers likely do not result from a strat-
egy to manage ecosystem services using commu-
nity institutions. However, because village fixed 
effects were significant in predicting fallow man-
agement, I cannot rule out the possibility that un-
observed village institutions affect fallow, though 
these impacts could simply reflect variations in 
market and agroecological conditions. 
  The empirical model does demonstrate support 
for the hypothesis that missing markets contribute 
to fallow management decisions. Access to com-
mercial credit has a negative and significant ef-
fect on the amount of land allocated to fallow for 
farmers who practice shifting cultivation (though 
not on the decision to fallow). Farmers located 
farther from markets and with less frequent trans-
portation access devote more land to fallow. Off-
                                                                                    
17 Nor is there significant spatial correlation in the error term of either 
the continuous (p = 0.13) or binary (0.40) fallow equation when the 
upstream fallow land variable is excluded from the regression.  
18 Because outcomes in these 11 villages did not vary, the fixed-ef-
fects logit equation includes only 180 observations. 
farm wage income also has a significant negative 
effect on fallowing despite the potential for up-
ward bias in the coefficient estimate, suggesting 
that its impact on alleviating liquidity constraints 
outweighs the effect of decreasing on-farm labor 
availability. Labor endowment is important as 
well. The number of present working-age mem-
bers has a significant negative effect on fallow 
percentage, as would be expected if labor is a 
limiting factor. The number of absent family 
members (whether working- or non-working–age) 
positively affects fallow in some specifications, 
which could occur if farmers delay land-clearing 
in anticipation of having labor return to the farm 
in the future. These results are consistent with the 
predictions from the theoretical model that lower 
capital and labor endowments under liquidity 
constraints discourage cultivation. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, off-farm non-wage income has no sig-
nificant impact on fallowing. This result could 
arise because non-wage income largely consists 
of government subsidies directed to low-income 
households for consumption, which could have 
minimal effects on farm production decisions. 
  Farms facing higher fertilizer prices are more 
likely to devote land to fallow, which is unsur-
prising since fallowing and fertilizer are substi-
tutes for soil quality improvement. In contrast to 
the theoretical model predictions, crop prices are 
positively associated with fallowing in the non-
spatial, non–fixed-effects model, though other-
wise crop and forest product prices have no signi-
ficant effect on land allocation. 
  Farmers who hold legal title to their land are 
significantly more likely to allocate land to fallow 
than those who do not, confirming the predictions 
of the theoretical model and other empirical re-
search that more secure land tenure leads to higher 
levels of forest cover. Household heads with 
more education also devote more land to fallow, 
though this relationship is not statistically signi-
ficant. Consistent with previous literature, fallow-
ing is more likely on land with steeper slopes, 
though this result is not significant across all 
models. The positive and significant effect of 
farm size on the percentage of fallow land indi-
cates that larger farms cultivate less intensively. 
  The majority of explanatory variables included 
in the fallow equations have the same sign in both 
the binary and continuous regression equations, 
even if they are not all statistically significant Klemick  Constraints or Cooperation? Determinants of Secondary Forest Cover Under Shifting Cultivation   485 
 
 
across both decisions. In other cases, a variable 
significantly affects whether to fallow in one di-
rection but has a different (though insignificant) 
effect on the percent area in fallow, or vice versa. 
There is little guidance from the theoretical model 
on why this might occur, but regional agroeco-
logical factors might provide some insights. The 
decision whether to fallow or not represents a 
switch in farming regimes between a traditional 
fallow system and a modern continuous cultiva-
tion approach dependent on chemical inputs, 
which could be considered irreversible in the 
short-to-medium term. By contrast, the percent 
area under fallow is a shorter-term decision that 
farmers can alter from year to year in response to 
shifts in market conditions and household circum-
stances. Viewed in this context, it is plausible that 
farm ownership status and distance from village 
markets would have strong impacts on the deci-
sion to fallow or continuously cultivate but negli-
gible effects on the percent area under fallow in a 
given year. However, it is still somewhat surpris-
ing that higher average fertilizer prices positively 
affect the fallowing decision but not the percent 
fallow area, and that commercial credit access 
increases the area under fallow but not the like-
lihood that a household permanently switches to 
continuous cultivation. 
  Despite these few counterintuitive results, the 
overall findings echo those from other studies 
showing the importance of land quality, tenure, 
and access to transportation, capital, and labor for 
forest management, even in a region like the Bra-
gantina in relatively close proximity to regional 
markets. 
 
Conclusions and Implications for Tropical 
Forest Policy 
 
This study builds on the extensive literature on 
tropical deforestation by examining the land use 
decisions of shifting cultivators in a context where 
land is settled and private land tenure is prevalent. 
Farmers in Bragantina maintain large amounts of 
land in forest fallow, which provides them with 
important on- and off-site ecosystem services, but 
also comes at a cost of foregone near-term in-
come from crop production. 
  Econometric results suggest that this land-man-
agement pattern likely does not arise because 
farmers internalize local externalities via commu-
nity institutions. Rather, farmers facing transpor-
tation barriers, few capital and labor resources, 
and high fertilizer prices devote more land to 
fallow, indicating that market failures pose a bar-
rier to agricultural intensification, even in a re-
gion that is well-connected to markets by devel-
oping country standards. Farmers who own their 
land also find it more advantageous to fallow. 
  These findings have important implications for 
policymakers pursuing the objectives of poverty 
alleviation and forest conservation in the Ama-
zon. Like much of the previous literature on de-
forestation, they point to a tradeoff between eco-
nomic development and forest conservation, since 
improved access to liquidity, inputs, and markets 
tends to exacerbate secondary forest loss. How-
ever, the existence of local beneficial spillovers 
implies that removing these barriers to agricul-
tural intensification could have ambiguous impli-
cations for community-level income. While lim-
iting market access does not present a viable or 
attractive approach to reducing deforestation, poli-
cymakers might consider whether paying farmers 
for forest ecosystem services rather than investing 
in infrastructure and market access would be a 
better use of resources to achieve the joint objec-
tives of poverty alleviation and forest preservation. 
  Global carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
services provided by secondary forest could make 
additional forest fallow desirable from an inter-
national perspective. Schemes such as payments 
for ecosystem services (PES) (Wunder, Engel, 
and Pagiola 2008) or reduced emissions from de-
forestation and forest degradation could be war-
ranted to promote increased forest cover while 
compensating farmers for the opportunity costs of 
foregone agricultural production. Indeed, Borner, 
Mendoza, and Vosti (2007) showed that a hypo-
thetical PES scheme for mature secondary forests 
in Bragantina could raise farm income levels and 
forest carbon stocks under current technology. 
  Brazil’s federal and state governments have 
demonstrated an interest in PES with the estab-
lishment of pilot initiatives such as Amazonas’ 
state-level Bolsa Floresta (“forest grant”) small-
holder program and the introduction in 2007 of 
national legislation to legalize PES (Hall 2008). 
The federal Proambiente program has voiced simi-
lar goals, though its focus on subsidized credit 
and agricultural technology restrictions suggests 
attention to different priorities. Brazil’s national 486    December 2011  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
forest laws have historically focused on the pro-
tection of virgin forest and overlooked secondary 
forest, but as PES programs gain a foothold in 
Brazil, it could be beneficial to both smallholders 
and the environment to explicitly incorporate sec-
ondary forest management as an eligible land use 
category, given the regional and global ecosystem 
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